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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant's sentencing on March 24, 1989, conducted 
pursuant to Babbel 1, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989) was not a "nunc pro 
tunc act". The trial court erred by declining to consider the 
Appellant's exemplary record at the prison since the date of his 
conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
REFUSING TO CONSIDER THE APPELLANT'S EXEMPLARY 
PRISON RECORD AS A MITIGATING FACTOR AT HIS 
SENTENCING HEARING. 
The sentences imposed by the trial court at the original 
sentencing hearing were illegal because they did not comply with 
U.C.A. § 76-5-405 and U.C.A. § 76-5-302. For that reason, this 
Court, in Babbel I, vacated the illegal sentences and remanded the 
case for re-sentencing. 
The State, in its responsive brief has endeavored to justify 
the exclusion of the mitigating prison performance evidence by 
advancing a nunc pro tunc argument. However, the State has cited 
no authority in support of this argument. Rules of appellate 
advocacy dictate that the State's argument should be dismissed for 
this reason alone. (A brief on appeal must contain some support 
for each contention). State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 
1989); (an appellate court will not engage in constructing argu-
1 
ments out of a whole cloth). State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 
1247 n.5 (Utah 1988); (the Court declined to rule on a constitu-
tional claim unsupported by legal analysis or authority). State 
v. Ami cone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984); also see Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 24(a). 
Notwithstanding the State's briefing error, the State's 
argument fails because the entry of the judgment following the 
sentencing hearing on March 24, 1989, was not a nunc pro tunc act. 
A Nunc Pro Tunc Order may be entered to reflect something which was 
actually done by the Court; however, this device may not be used 
to supply an omission in the record, i.e. for something which was 
not done. This Court has stated that "[a] motion nunc pro tunc is 
used to make the record speak the truth: it may not be used to 
correct the Court's failure to speak." Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 
298, 299 (Utah 1984). (The function of the entry of a Nunc Pro 
Tunc Order is the correction of judicial records insofar as they 
fail to record, or improperly record, a judgment rendered by the 
Court, as distinguished from the correction of an error in the 
judgment itself or in the failure to render the judgment). DuPonte 
v. DuPonte, 53 Haw. 123, 488 P.2d 537 (1971); (the purpose of a 
Nunc Pro Tunc Order is to provide a means of entering the actual 
judgment of the trial court which for one reason or another was not 
properly recorded). Wallace v. Wallace, 214 Kan. 344, 520 P.2d 
2 
1221 (1974); (nunc pro tunc has reference to the making of an 
entry now, of something which was actually previously done,, so as 
to have it effective as of the earlier date; it is not to be used 
to supply some omitted action of the court or counsel, but may be 
utilized to supply an omission in the record of something really 
done but omitted through mistake or advertence). Mora v. Martinez, 
80 N.M. 88, 451 P. 2d 992 (1969); (although a trial court by an 
Order Nunc Pro Tunc may correct the record judgment theretofore, 
it may not, by such an Order, render another or different judgment 
as one which it intended to render but did not). Humphrey Oil 
Corp. v. Lindsey, 370 P.2d 296 (Okla. 1961). 
CONCLUSION 
The challenged sentencing hearing was not a nunc pro tunc act. 
The proffered mitigation evidence was relevant and the trial judge 
was duty bound to consider all of the Appellant's circumstances on 
the day that he stood before the Judge for imposition of sentence. 
Both due process and a common sense reading of U.C.A. § 
76-3-201(5)(c) mandate the consideration of the Appellant's 
exemplary behavior while incarcerated. The trial court's failure 
3 
to consider this evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion and 
necessitates a remand for an additional sentencing hearing. 
DATED this I ff day of SK yJLn, 1991, 
HA < * - • 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR 
Attorney for Appellant 
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PUNISHMENTS 76-3-201 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full 
hearing on the issue. 
(4) As used in Subsection (3): 
(a) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(b) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's crimi-
nal activities and includes, but is not limited to, the money equivalent of 
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses such 
as earnings and medical expenses. 
(c) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including insured damages. 
(d) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. "Vic-
tim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activi-
ties. 
(5) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances 
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, or pre-
senting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining if circumstances exist that justify imposition of the 
highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the 
probation officer's report, other reports, including reports received under 
Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by 
the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at 
the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
(6) (a) If a defendant subject to Subsection (5) has been sentenced and com-
mitted to the Utah State Prison the court may, within 120 days of the 
date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the recom-
mendation of the Board of Pardons, recall the sentence and commitment 
previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if 
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ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN & BOUD, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
:hard I. Ashton 302 West 5400 South Telephone 
tyne H. Braunberger Suite 103 (801) 263-0300 
bert J. Poulsen Murray, Utah 84107 
nes R. Boud Facsimile 
idley R. Jones* (801) 263-0338 
vid A. Wilde 
censed also in 
.ho and Nebraska 
June 24, 1991 F I L E D 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk JUN 2 7 fOQf 
Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
RE: J.H. vs. West Valley Cityf et al. 
Appeal No. 900052 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
By letter of June 14, 1991, Allan Larson, Counsel for West 
Valley City, alerted the court to three cases: D.T. v. Independent 
School District, 894 F.2d 1176 (10th Cir. 1990); Thomas v. Cannon, 
751 F.Supp. 765 (N.N.D. 111. 1990); and Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 
771 (Utah 1988). 
The Johnson v. Rogers case was discussed during oral argument 
of this matter, and need not be discussed any further at this time. 
The Thomas v. Cannon case involves a bus driver, not a police 
officer. Furthermore, the driver was employed by a private agency 
which had contracted with the city, a much more tenuous relation-
ship than the relationship of Officer Lyday to West Valley City. 
The D.T. v. Independent School District case deals with a 
school teacher who allegedly molested students in conjunction with 
activities at a summer basketball camp conducted by the school 
teacher. The court in that case made a point of observing that the 
teacher "... was under no obligation to the school district. He 
was then on his free or summer vacation. As such, he had no duties 
or obligations owing to or functions to perform for the school 
district." (894 F.2d 1186. See also further discussion of this 
issue on subsequent pages.) The court also specifically 
distinguished the school teacher from a police officer case, even 
an "off-duty" police officer. (Id. at 1188.) 
Sincerely, 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN 
& BOUD, P.C. 
)avid A. Wilde 
BY 
David 
DAW/hyo 
